Multi-agent LLM simulations testing algorithmic collusion and coordination breakdown in oligopoly markets.
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Updated
Jul 9, 2025 - Jupyter Notebook
Multi-agent LLM simulations testing algorithmic collusion and coordination breakdown in oligopoly markets.
Learning agents in oligopolies (Cournot / Stackelberg) Agent-based model
Replication of Calvano et al. (2020) 'Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion' (AER)
Algorithmic collusion in market making.
Simulation of RL agents playing in repeated auction games.
Q-learning pricing agents under latency, noise, and asynchronous actions — thesis, simulations, and reproducible results.
A Gymnasium-style suite of economics reinforcement-learning environments with closed-form equilibrium benchmarks.
Learned coalition deception and defensive adaptation in a social-deduction benchmark
Do independent Q-learning agents tacitly collude in a uniform-price electricity auction? Three behavioural tests on 50-seed sweeps: high prices yes, collusion not proven.
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