Report privately via GitHub's security advisories ("Report a vulnerability" on the repository's Security tab) or by email to ryan@ryanseys.com. Please do not open public issues for suspected vulnerabilities.

• Programs compiled by Zeo execute with the full privileges of the invoking user, like any native binary; compiling untrusted Ruby source is equivalent to running it.
• SecureRandom/OpenSSL::Random draw from the operating system's CSPRNG.
• The openssl extension binds a vendored OpenSSL 3.x through the official rust-openssl bindings, so the digest, cipher, BN and TLS primitives are the ones CRuby binds. Client-side TLS verifies certificates: SSLContext honours verify_mode, ca_file/ca_path and the system trust store. As in CRuby, a bare SSLContext.new starts at VERIFY_NONE -- net/http raises it to VERIFY_PEER, but code that builds its own context must set it. PKey generation, X509 issuance, PKCS#7, ASN1 and SSLServer are declined; see docs/how-to/add-an-extension.md and docs/reference/compatibility.md.
• OpenSSL links statically into every compiled binary. An OpenSSL security fix reaches a program only when you rebuild it with an updated Zeo. Programs already shipped keep the version they were compiled with.
• Kernel#rand/Random are deterministic PRNGs and are NOT suitable for secrets (true in CRuby as well).

Pre-1.0: only the main branch receives fixes.