Solidity for DarkRoute — a private, non-custodial swap router on Robinhood Chain (chain id 4663). No account, no KYC; the venue that fills your order is named as-is and the fee is printed before you deposit.
- App — https://app.darkroute.exchange
- Docs — https://darkroute.exchange/docs
$DARK—0xebb4c5b97e4117e30ec82ce025e6f21dded05436
Nothing here is deployed and nothing here is audited. The tests pass; that is a different claim. See the checklist at the bottom.
forge install foundry-rs/forge-std --no-git # lib/ is gitignored
forge test -vvA commitment escrow for $DARK. Holding already qualifies an address for a fee tier; staking here keeps the tokens in one readable place and marks the address as boosted while the commitment runs.
It has no admin. No owner, no pause, no upgrade path, no sweep, no fee. The only address that can move a user's tokens is that user. The token address is immutable and set at construction. There is deliberately nothing to trust here beyond the code.
Unstaking is always allowed and nothing is burned. That is the published design — an early exit drops the boost immediately and costs nothing else, because penalties on a user's own funds invite a regulatory argument nobody needs. The honest consequence: this escrow makes a commitment legible, it does not force supply off the market. A user who wants out is out.
Read tierBalance(address) for tiers — staked plus held, so staking never lowers a tier.
The burn wall's ledger. A thin recorder in front of the token's own burnFrom.
Burning is already possible without it — what is not possible without it is knowing why a burn
happened. Calling burn() on the token emits a transfer to the zero address and nothing more; no
amount of reading that log tells you which day's revenue paid for it. This attaches a note, a
running total, and a per-source total, so protocol burns can be shown apart from anyone else's.
It never holds tokens. burnFrom pulls from the caller and destroys them in the same call, so
the contract's balance is permanently zero. Nothing to steal, no admin-withdrawal question.
Anyone may burn. No owner, no allowlist. The spam control is that burning costs the caller their own tokens.
The caller must approve the burner first.
Read from the deployed bytecode on 2026-09-08:
burn(uint256), burnFrom(address,uint256) |
present — burns really lower totalSupply |
mint(address,uint256) |
absent — supply cannot be inflated |
owner(), transferOwnership(), pause() |
absent — the token has no admin at all |
That is a genuinely clean fair-launch token, and it is checkable by anyone against the bytecode rather than taken on trust.
- External audit. The blueprint commits to one before Phase 2 and this is Phase 2.
- Deploy from a key that is not on the server. Nothing in DarkRoute's infrastructure needs the deployer key, and per the project's own rules a key that lives on a box is a key that leaks.
- Constructor takes the $DARK token:
0xebb4c5b97e4117e30ec82ce025e6f21dded05436. - Verify on Blockscout, then point the app's tier reader at
tierBalance()instead of the rawbalanceOfinlib/chain.ts.
Not deployed. Not audited. Tests pass; that is not the same thing.