TrustBeat Java SDK

Qualified electronic timestamps and Merkle anchoring — eIDAS-compliant, over a simple API.

Part of TrustBeat — digital trust infrastructure for the EU. All SDKs (Python, TypeScript, Java, C#, Go): trustbeat.eu/sdks.

Install

Maven:

<dependency>
    <groupId>eu.trustbeat</groupId>
    <artifactId>trustbeat-sdk</artifactId>
    <version>0.2.0</version>
</dependency>

Gradle:

implementation 'eu.trustbeat:trustbeat-sdk:0.2.0'

Quickstart

import eu.trustbeat.sdk.TrustBeat;
import eu.trustbeat.sdk.AnchorJob;
import eu.trustbeat.sdk.AnchorProof;

TrustBeat tb = new TrustBeat.Builder().apiKey("tb_live_...").build();

// Anchor a file (SHA-256 computed locally, file never leaves your machine).
// anchorFileWait() blocks until the proof is ready (next batch, up to 11 min).
AnchorProof proof = tb.anchorFileWait(Path.of("contract.pdf"));
System.out.println(proof.getId());          // tracking ID
System.out.println(proof.getAnchoredAt());  // ISO 8601 timestamp
System.out.println(proof.getMerkleRoot());  // Merkle root of the batch

// Verify locally — no network call
boolean valid = tb.verify(proof);

// Or anchor a raw SHA-256 hash without blocking, then wait for the proof.
AnchorJob job = tb.anchor("e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855");
AnchorProof waited = tb.anchorWait(job.getId());  // polls up to 11 min

Tamper-Evident Logs (NIS2)

Anchor a log hash together with canonical metadata for NIS2 Article 21 audit trails. The server seals the metadata into the Merkle leaf, so the proof covers both the log content and its context.

import eu.trustbeat.sdk.*;
import java.nio.file.Path;

TrustBeat tb = new TrustBeat.Builder().apiKey("tb_live_...").build();

// Hash the log yourself — content never leaves your machine.
String logHash = TrustBeat.hashFile(Path.of("app.log"));

LogMetadata meta = new LogMetadata.Builder()
    .logSource(new LogSource.Builder().uri("/var/log/app.log").name("Application log").build())
    .sourceIdentity(new LogSourceIdentity.Builder().hostname("web-01").serviceName("payments").build())
    .timeEnvelope(new LogTimeEnvelope("2026-04-15T00:00:00Z", "2026-04-15T23:59:59Z"))
    .build();

LogAnchorJob job = tb.anchorLog(logHash, meta, "incident-2026-05");
System.out.println(job.getId() + " " + job.getCombinedHash());

// Wait for the qualified anchor (next batch, up to ~11 min).
LogProof proof = tb.anchorLogWait(job.getId());
System.out.println(proof.getVerificationStatus()); // "VERIFIED"

Webhooks

If your account has a webhook secret configured, every delivery is signed with an X-TrustBeat-Signature header. Verify it with the raw request body — before any JSON parsing:

boolean ok = TrustBeat.verifyWebhookSignature(rawBody, signatureHeader, webhookSecret);
if (!ok) throw new SecurityException("Invalid webhook signature");

Rejects replays older than 5 minutes by default; see WebhookVerifier for the overload with explicit tolerance.

Portable proof bundles for offline verification: exportAiDecision(id), exportVerification(id), exportLog(id) — each returns raw JSON bundle bytes.

Requirements

• Java 11+
• Zero runtime dependencies (java.net.http, java.security from stdlib)

Documentation

Full API reference and guides at api.trustbeat.eu/docs

License

MIT — see LICENSE

Merkle algorithm

Every proof declares how it must be folded, in proof.getMerkleAlgorithm():

Value	Construction
trustbeat-legacy-sha256	leaf = your hash, parent = SHA-256(left || right)
rfc6962-sha256	leaf = SHA-256(0x00 || hash), parent = SHA-256(0x01 || left || right)

verify dispatches on it for you. A proof with no label was issued before the field existed and is legacy. An algorithm this SDK version does not implement throws UnsupportedAlgorithmException rather than returning false — "cannot check" is not "invalid".

Audit event proofs

verifyAuditEvent folds an audit event proof the same way:

AuditEventProof proof = client.getAuditEventProof(eventId);
try {
    System.out.println(client.verifyAuditEvent(proof));
} catch (IncompleteProofException e) {
    // The server predates API 1.46 and sent no merkle_root, so there is nothing
    // to fold against. The proof is not invalid — verify it server-side instead.
}

Treating that exception as a failed proof would be wrong: it means "cannot check", not "tampered".