One codebase, explained three times: to the engineer who inherits it, to the person who uses the product to get a job done, and to the executive deciding whether to back it. Alongside them, the working documentation the repository already carried, rendered so it can be read in a browser.
The packs published here were made entirely on local hardware. The chapters were written by a 27-billion-parameter model running on a GPU in our own rack, reading a private repository that never left it and citing the file and lines behind every claim. The diagrams were drawn as code by the same model. The narration came from a local speech model, the illustration from a local image-to-video model, and the assembly from a deterministic compositor and FFmpeg on the same machine. No hosted model saw the source, which is what makes the work possible on a codebase under a confidentiality agreement.
site/public/— the landing page, the stylesheet, the unlock script, and an abstract generated clip. This is everything that is readable.site/enc/— the packs, sealed. Every file is encrypted, and the manifest naming them is encrypted too, so the repository does not disclose what a pack contains.tools/pack.mjs— seals a collection. AES-256-GCM under a key derived from a passphrase by PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations.tools/verify.mjs— proves a build before it ships: that the key opens a file of every kind including video, and that a wrong key opens nothing.tools/refuse-plaintext.mjs— the check that nothing readable is being published, run both here and by the deploy workflow so the two cannot drift apart. It asks whether a file is a readable file of a known kind — a signature at its own offset, or an opening that is all printable text — rather than searching for short markers. Ciphertext produces "PNG" or a leading brace by chance often enough that a marker search fails a healthy build of eight hundred files most runs, and a gate that cries wolf is a gate that gets waved through.
The pages themselves are not built here. The packs come from the explainer skill in
agentbox; the documentation stack is rendered by that
skill's scripts/docs-stack.mjs, which turns a repository's own docs/ tree into this house
style, showing each diagram as drawn and keeping its mermaid source one click below.
A static host serves whatever path is asked for, so a password checked in JavaScript protects nothing: the files sit next to the check. Here the host serves ciphertext. A reader's browser derives the key from the passphrase and decrypts in memory, and a clip is handed to the player as a blob rather than a URL, so no fetchable path to it exists.
This holds against anyone who finds the repository. It does not hold against someone who has the passphrase, and ciphertext in public can be attacked offline by anyone patient, which is why the passphrase is long and the derivation slow.
The passphrase is shared separately and is not in this repository.
node tools/pack.mjs --pack <name> --src <directory> --out site --passphrase '<phrase>'
node tools/verify.mjs --site site --pack <name> --passphrase '<phrase>' [--marker <word>]
--marker refuses a build in which a given word appears anywhere in the ciphertext, for a name
that must not travel. It is an argument rather than a constant because this repository is
public, and a list of names you are trying not to publish is itself a disclosure.
Sealing happens on the machine that holds the source. The key never reaches a CI runner, and
the workflow refuses to publish a build in which anything under site/enc is readable.