Security fixes are provided for the latest released version. Please make sure you are running the most recent release before reporting an issue.

How PandaBranchPlus handles connections and privileged actions:

• Panda WebSocket. The plugin controls the Panda Branch Plus over its local WebSocket interface (ws://<panda-host>/ws). The device firmware itself exposes this interface without authentication — anyone on the LAN who can reach the Panda's IP can switch its channels, with or without this plugin. Keep the Panda on a trusted network segment.
• No credentials. The plugin stores only the Panda's host/IP. It never handles printer access codes; the printer state is read from OctoPrint's own state machine (fed by a connector plugin such as OctoPrint-BambuConnector).
• Privileged actions. Switching channels and changing channel configuration via the plugin's API is permission-gated through OctoPrint's access control; unauthenticated browser sessions cannot toggle power channels through the plugin.
• Fail-safe. If the WebSocket connection to the Panda is lost, each channel falls back to its configured fail-safe state (default: off) so a dead link never leaves heaters or pumps in an undefined state.
• Logging. Diagnostic frame logging is off by default and never includes credentials (the protocol contains none).

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Report vulnerabilities by email to ajimaru_gdr [at] pm [dot] me. Include:

• A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact.
• Steps to reproduce or a proof-of-concept (if safe to share).
• Any suggested mitigations you are aware of.

You will receive an acknowledgement of your report, followed by a status update once it has been reviewed. If the issue is confirmed, a patch and coordinated disclosure will follow as quickly as possible.

Issues in scope for this project:

• Authentication or authorization bypasses in the plugin's API endpoints.
• Arbitrary file read/write via plugin settings or API.
• Unsafe shell command execution triggered by user-controlled input.
• Channel state manipulation by users without the required OctoPrint permission.
• Denial of service caused by the plugin's connection management logic.

Out of scope:

• Vulnerabilities in OctoPrint itself — please report those to the OctoPrint project.
• Vulnerabilities in the Panda Branch Plus firmware (including its unauthenticated WebSocket and web interface) — please report those to BIQU / BigTreeTech. The plugin cannot add authentication the device does not have.
• Issues that require physical access to the OctoPrint host.