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[Aikido] Fix IPv4-mapped IPv6 SSRF bypass in IP matcher fallback - #743
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This patch addresses a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the IP matcher fallback module where IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses could bypass configured IP filtering rules. The fix implements address canonicalization to convert IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g., ::ffff:192.168.1.1) to their standard IPv4 form before matching against configured rules. The changes were made to aikido_zen/helpers/ip_matcher_fallback/init.py to ensure consistent IP address normalization and prevent attackers from circumventing SSRF protections through IPv6 address format manipulation.
✅ 1 issue fixed by this PR
preparse()and converts IPv4-mapped IPv6 values to their embedded IPv4 form, but the fallback directly callsparse_base_network()for both configured networks and lookup values. Consequently, a mapped IPv6 candidate cannot match an equivalent IPv4 rule. In the SSRF path, this can suppress both private-IP and IMDS detections before blocking is performed. The same shared defect can also cause IPv4 blocklists to miss a client address when it reaches policy evaluation in mapped form. The fallback is a supported path, including the documented Windows configuration wherepytriciais omitted.