Repository navigation
[Aikido] Pin Poetry and poetry-core versions to mitigate supply-chain vulnerability - #741
Closed
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Closed
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
…te supply-chain risk
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This patch addresses a supply-chain vulnerability by pinning Poetry to version 1.8.5 and poetry-core to version 1.9.1, eliminating the risk of unintended version upgrades that could introduce malicious or compromised code. The fixes were applied across all release workflows (.github/workflows/publish.yml and test-publish.yml), the shared Makefile, the sample-apps/lambda-mongo/Makefile, and the pyproject.toml build system configuration. By explicitly specifying exact versions rather than using flexible version constraints, the build and deployment processes are now protected against supply-chain attacks targeting the Poetry toolchain.
✅ 1 issue fixed by this PR
publish.ymlrunspip install poetryand thenmake build, whose build target invokespoetry buildbefore the pinned PyPI publishing action uploads the resulting distributions. A malicious or compromised Poetry release can therefore execute as part of the build and rewrite the workspace or distribution that is subsequently published to consumers.test-publish.ymland the sharedMakefileretain independently reachable unpinned installations, whilepyproject.tomlalso permits mutable PEP 517 resolution throughpoetry-core>=1.0.0. The pinned publication action and disabled checkout credentials reduce some ancillary risk but do not protect artifact integrity from a compromised build tool.