preload.ts:232 exposes raw ipcRenderer.on(event, msg) to renderer through contextBridge. any js running in the renderer can subscribe to literally any IPC channel and eavesdrop on internal app events
this completely defeats the whole sandbox concept. extensions can listen to everything, including msgs they should never have access to
sooo, any extension can spy on all inter-process communication going on in the app
fix: expose only specific whitelisted IPC channels through contextBridge instead of the whole ipcRenderer obj. use a wrapper that filters events by name and vaildates payloads before passing anything through
preload.ts:232exposes rawipcRenderer.on(event, msg)to renderer throughcontextBridge. any js running in the renderer can subscribe to literally any IPC channel and eavesdrop on internal app eventsthis completely defeats the whole sandbox concept. extensions can listen to everything, including msgs they should never have access to
sooo, any extension can spy on all inter-process communication going on in the app
fix: expose only specific whitelisted IPC channels through
contextBridgeinstead of the wholeipcRendererobj. use a wrapper that filters events by name and vaildates payloads before passing anything through